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Abstract
Khaled Abou El Fadl has done more in his Article than simply argue the possibility of democracy in the Muslim world. He reminds us that Islam is not a monolithic idea lacking varying
contours, possibilities, and dispositions. Whether in talking about an Islamic legal system or an
Islamic political system, the most frequent mistake is assuming that there is an ideal vision of
such systems that precludes debate, difference, and the continued search for possibilities. Another
common mistake is to presume that the limits of an “Islamic political system” are inherent in the
existing practice of so-called Muslim States. To generalize from the mere examples of modern
Muslim Nation-States is to take away the dynamism of an intellectual tradition that has generated
debate and discourse extending well beyond the existence of Muslim Nation-States in the modern world. Abou El Fadl’s argument suggests that when one discusses the relationship between
Islam and democracy, one necessarily argues in the expansive arena of ideas. Moreover, by positing democratic institutions as possibilities within an Islamic context, Abou El Fadl makes room
for dynamism, difference, and debate within the empirical context. Central to Abou El Fadl’s
argument is the need for Muslims to make a premoral commitment to democracy. Such a premoral commitment is not simply a function of political expediency or opportunism. Rather, as
the Islamic tradition suggests, the human agent plays a significant role in the determination of
that premoral commitment on the basis of a rational investigation into the various signs of God’s
creation. Whether one inquires into law or political science, Shari‘ah’s discourses empower the
human agent to come to terms with the Divine Will in light of the totality of existence and creation. The resulting governmental structure may not necessarily be what God wills, but that is
not what humanity is obligated to determine. We are charged with the search. And as Abou El
Fadl rightly points out, the search for the harmony between Islam and democracy begins with a
premoral commitment to democracy.
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Khaled Abou El Fadl has done more in his Article than simply argue the possibility of democracy in the Muslim world. He
reminds us that Islam is not a monolithic idea lacking varying
contours, possibilities, and dispositions. Whether in talking
about an Islamic legal system or an Islamic political system, the
most frequent mistake is assuming that there is an ideal vision of
such systems that precludes debate, difference, and the continued search for possibilities. Another common mistake is to presume that the limits of an "Islamic political system" are inherent
in the existing practice of so-called Muslim States. To generalize
from the mere examples of modern Muslim Nation-States is to
take away the dynamism of an intellectual tradition that has generated debate and discourse extending well beyond the existence of Muslim Nation-States in the modern world. Abou El
Fadl's argument suggests that when one discusses the relationship between Islam and democracy, one necessarily argues in the
expansive arena of ideas. Moreover, by positing democratic institutions as possibilities within an Islamic context, Abou El Fadl
makes room for dynamism, difference, and debate within the
empirical context.
Clearly, Muslim countries today have an interest in bringing
Islam into their constitutional and political orders. Numerous
countries with majority Muslim populations provide explicitly in
their constitutions that Islamic law [Shari'ah] is either a source
or the source of law.' Syria's constitution stipulates that the pres* Doctoral candidate at UCLA's History Department in Islamic Legal History;
M.A., University of Texas;J.D., UCLA School of Law; B.A., UC Berkeley. I would like to
thank Professor Abou El Fadl for inviting me to respond to his thought-provoking Article, and the Fordham International LawJournal for supporting the publication of this
response. I am indebted to Mairaj Syed for providing critical comments on early drafts
of this response and for selflessly supporting its publication. Jihad Turk and Anjum Mir
also provided much appreciated and useful comments. All faults or failures of the argument contained herein are my own.
1. See, e.g., BAHRAIN CONST. art. 2; COMOROS CONST. pmbl.; EGYPT CONST. art. 2;
IRAN CONST. art. 4; KUWAIT CONST. art. 2; MALDIVES CONST. art. 38; OMAN CONST. Pt. 1,
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ident of the country must be Muslim.2 Saudi Arabia's Basic Law
not only makes the Qur'an and Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad foundational documents of its legal system, but also invokes
the Islamic principle of enjoining the good and forbidding the
evil [al-amr bi al-ma'rufwa al-nahy 'an al-munkar] as a motivating
principle of government and society.'
The role of Shari'ah is of both symbolic and substantive
value in these societies. Shari'ah, vulgarly translated as Islamic
law, is a system of thought that aspires to address all aspects of
human behavior. It deals not only with substantive law, but also
with the ways we think in light of various indicators around us.
Such indicators include sacred texts, such as the Qur'an and
Sunnah, but they can also include other aspects of creation.
God consistently reminds Muslims that the truth He wants Muslims to understand can be found and understood through the
various signs of creation.4 To read Shari'ah as simply dealing
with "law" in the positivist sense of the term is therefore reductive.
In a sense, Shari'ah's discourses reflect similar patterns of
thought and function to those found in contemporary debates
on virtue ethics and natural law theory. For Aristotle, virtue
guides a person's dispositions, which are themselves grounded
in human nature. Nature provides the moral foundation for the
normativity of virtue, as well as the possibilities among which
humans make moral choices. 5 Virtue exists in man by reason of
his nature as man, but virtue alone does not make for moral
choice. Virtue sets in man dispositions toward behavior, and acting together with prudence, yields positive behavior. As Aristotle
states: "Virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in
the observance of the mean relative to us, this being determined
by principle, that is, as the prudent man would determine it."6
Alisdair Maclntyre, relies heavily on the Aristotelian model of
art. 2;

QATAR CONST. art. 1; SAUDI ARABIA CONST. art. 3; SUDAN CONST. art.
CONST. art. 3(2); UNITED ARAB EMIRATES CONST. art. 7; YEMEN CONST. art. 2.

65; SYRIA

2. SYRIA CONST. art. 3(1).
3. BAsIc LAw OF SAUDI ARABIA art. 23.
4. See, e.g., QUR'AN 2:118, 145, 248; 3:41, 49; 5:114; 6:4, 25; 7:106-07; 10:96-97.

5.
6.

ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE

(1984).
41 (Harris Rackham trans., Wordsworth

ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHics

Editions Limited 1996).
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dispositions to assert the existence of virtues. 7 He writes about
the importance of the social roles people play and how such
roles can provide a basis for the determination of morality. Such
roles establish what might be called dispositions, i.e., dispositions
of what someone in that particular role would do under certain
circumstances. For Maclntyre, the moral agent is one who is immersed in a social context. It is that social context that produces
both the dispositions of the individual and the moral foundation
upon which such dispositions lead to normative behavior. The
soul is therefore very much connected to its social context; it is
that context which provides both the normative foundation and
epistemological objectivity of moral action. MacIntyre seems to
suggest that virtues like justice, for example, do change in content with changed circumstances and times. Such change and
difference does not undermine the enduring value of notions of
justice.8
In many ways, Abou El Fadl's argument about democracy
follows similar lines of thought. To follow God's command and
to look to nature for His will and guidance makes nature a basis
for further moral determinations. The knowledge of democracy, as a virtue, can be inductively gleaned from the vast array of
human experience. Human nature and its experience provide
both the context of analysis, as well as the foundation for the
normativity of democracy as a virtue.
Thus, the point here is that just as virtue ethicists may look
to nature to provide guidance on the determination of virtues,
such as justice or democracy, God has instructed Muslims to
make a similar inquiry in order to understand His will. Shari'ah
is not simply about weighing and balancing competing precedents of law in positivist fashion. It is a process that, by a foundational sense of nature, guides one in the construction and determination of moral action in light of the totality of circumstances
presented.
Premodern Muslim jurists argued that the natural dispositions within humanity can be the basis for establishing the
grounds of moral behavior. For example, the premodern jurist
al-Dabbusi (d. 430/1039) writes that acts are presumptively permissible. To justify his point, he relies on a theory of human
7. See
8.

MACINTYRE,

ALISDAIR

supra note 5.

MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?

WHICH RATIONALITY?

(1988).
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nature that posits nature as a normative foundation for obligation. He states:
God places in [human] nature dispositions from among the
desires such that rational animals engage in certain acts by
reason of the law of nature. When we notice this fact from
those things we do by nature, which constitute the substance
of life experiences, then it is not permitted to say that [what
we are] disposed to is prohibited, except by counter evidence
that changes the rule of the situation. So permissiveness is
the fundamental presumption [of obligation] and prohibition is a rebuttal [of that presumption] except when what is
considered a right of ours conflicts with an obligation upon
us. It is in this sense that we described permissibility.9
Contemporary virtue ethics have been criticized for failing
to provide clarity on the notion of moral obligation. While
MacIntyre writes in support of Aristotelian notions of dispositions, teleology, and virtue, he has been criticized for failing to
adequately theorize about how one actually makes moral decisions.' ° In the quest for an Islamic democracy, Muslims are
forced, according to Abou El Fadl, to make a moral commitment
to democracy. From that starting point, they make decisions
that obligate them to certain behaviors in light of the various
historical possibilities within the Islamic tradition. I would argue
that the commitment to democracy is not a moral commitment
that necessarily implies obligation, but rather guides subsequent
interpretation in light of particular contexts and circumstances.
Thus, obligation arises only after the virtue of democracy has
been established. Following John Finnis and Germain Grisez,
one might call the commitment to democracy a premoral commitment." The commitment to democracy in and of itself does
not carry obligations for humanity. Rather, it is a disposition toward human governance that sets in motion a variety of interpretive processes that result in obligations consistent with the commitment to democracy. These later interpretive processes are
what Finnis, Grisez, and others would call practical reasoning,
9.

ABu ZAYD 'UBAYD ALLAH B. & 'UMAR B. 'ISA AL-DABBUSI AL-HANAFI, TAQWiM AL-

449 (Khalil Muhyi al-Din al-Mis ed., 2001).
10. See, e.g., Russell Hittinger, Natural Law and Virtue: Theories at Cross Purposes, in
NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS, 42-70 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
11. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 101-03 (1993); 1 GERMAIN
GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUs 115-40 (1997).

ADILLA F1 USUL AL-FIQH
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which leads to moral decision-making. 12 It is only through the
application of context-sensitive practical reasoning that moral
decisions are made about rights, duties, and obligations. Finnis
states:
The principles that express the general ends of human life do
not acquire what would nowadays be called a 'moral' force
until they are brought to bear upon definite ranges of project, disposition, or action, or upon particular projects, dispositions, or actions. How they are to be 3 brought to bear is the
problem for practical reasonableness.'
Notably, Finnis and Grisez do not adopt the Aristotelian approach to virtue and obligation that is rooted in nature as a
moral foundation. They rely on an intuitive sense of virtue
which presumes that such virtues are self-evident. Effectively,
Finnis and Grisez do not offer a theory of virtue, as does
MacIntyre, but rather they offer a theory of practical reasoning
which, in a sense, compliments a theory of virtue by providing a
mechanism for moving beyond virtue to moral obligation.
Beyond the human determination of the virtue of democracy lies the determination of moral action in light of that commitment to democracy. Muslim jurists have argued about the
role of the human agent in the determination of good and evil.
At the heart of their debates on good and evil was the question
of moral obligation. In much of the contemporary literature on
this issue, scholars identify this issue as a theological one, and
further argue that premodern Muslim theologians broke down
into two camps. On the one hand were the voluntarists who argued that good and bad were functions of God's legislation. If
God commands X, then X is by definition good, and hence obligatory. If He prohibits Y, then Y is by definition evil, and hence
prohibited. On the other hand were the ethical rationalists, who
held that humans can make rationally based determinations of
good and evil where there is no revelational scripture.1 4
12. See FINNIS, supra note 11, at 100-33; see also GRISEZ, supra note 11, at 178-83. See
generally MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL LAW AND PRACTICAL RATIONALITY (2001); MARTIN
RHONHEIMER, NATURAL LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON: A THOMISTIC VIEW OF MORAL AuTONOMY (Gerald Malsbary trans., Fordham University Press 2000).
13. See FINNIS, supra note 11, at 101.
14. See generally George Makdisi, Ethics in Islamic TraditionalistDoctrine, in ETHICS IN
ISLAM 47-63(Richard G. Hovannisian ed., 1985); see also George F. Hourani, Divine Justice and Human Reason in Mu'tazilite Ethical Theology, in ETHICS IN ISLAM, supra, at 73-84.
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However, a closer scrutiny of premodern sources on this issue suggests that this dichotomy was not as strict or as distinctive
as contemporary scholarship suggests. Analyzing these views
from the perspective of jurisprudential literature rather than
theological literature, reveals that jurists of different theological
persuasions often argued that humans are able to make certain
moral claims independently of any text on the matter in light of
the totality of circumstances. For instance, whether one looks to
the Mu'tazili Abu Bakr al-Jassas (d. 981) or the Ash'ari Sayf alDin al-Amidi (d. 1233), one will find that both argue that
humans make moral judgments in a manner consistent with contemporary discourses on practical reasoning. For al-Jassas, universal moral judgments include the obligation of belief and the
prohibition against disbelief. Not all such decisions are necessarily of universal import. According to al-Jassas, in such cases one
must look to the benefit [intifa'] accorded by a certain issue to
determine its shar'i value. He couches his determination of
moral obligation in terms of the benefit such a matter produces
for humanity, in light of a contextual inquiry into nature, creation, and the circumstances of human goods. 5
AI-Amidi approaches this issue from a different perspective.
Like most voluntarists, he admits that good and evil are known
from God's legislation. But he also asserts that one can know
whether a matter is good or evil on the basis of the purpose
[gharad] that it satisfies. Alternatively one can also know
whether a matter is good or evil based on one's knowledge and
capacity to do an act that ultimately removes hardship.1 6 What is
important is that both authors recognize that the human agent is
very much involved in the determination of morality. Good and
evil, and thereby moral obligation, are not simply legislated by
God, but are determined by individuals using their practical reason to make determinations of moral obligation, in light of the
totality of circumstances in which a particular act arises.
If we consider Abou El Fadl's argument in light of the above
analysis, it becomes clear that democracy can be conceived of as
a virtue by reference to an inductive analysis of human nature
and experience. It is a philosophical assumption that one must
15. 2 ABU
16. 1 SAYF

BAKR AHiMAD

B.

'ALI AL-JASSAS, USUL AL-JASSAS 100

AL-DIN ABU AL-HASASN

F! USUL AL-AHKAM

61 (1997).
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(2000).
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make before ever approaching the historical Islamic tradition.
Muslim apologists have often referred to the same premodern
concepts that Abou El Fadl cites to argue for the unity of Islam
and democracy, such as the institution of Shura. What distinguishes Abou El Fadl from these apologists, and what makes his
argument more honest than theirs, is that he identifies the need
to make the premoral commitment to democracy. Once the
commitment is made, then the mechanisms of practical reasoning within the Islamic tradition can support the existence of
democratic institutions in a Muslim society. The Islamic historical tradition therefore provides possibilities, but Muslims themselves must make the premoral commitment to democracy
before democracy can ever be implemented in their society.
This necessarily suggests that between the ideals of Islam
and democracy, and the reality of Muslim States, lies a role for
human agents in an interpretive process by which both ideals are
actualized into a human reality of government and society. The
role of the human agent in such an interpretive process is not
only admitted by Shari'ah discourses, but it is in fact indispensable to the very understanding of the limits of interpretation in
the face of the perfection of the Divine. As Abou El Fadl indicates, premodern Muslim jurists inquired into issues of legal determinacy. They asked whether or not every jurist was correct in
his interpretation. The Mukhatti'a school, relying on the Prophetic tradition that those who are correct get two rewards and
those who are incorrect get one reward, argued that the law is
determinate, but it is not clear whether any particular answer is
necessarily God's law. In either case, the jurist is rewarded for
the effort of investigation. The Musawwiba school argued that
every jurist was correct in his interpretation. What mattered was
not whether there was a specific divine intent as to a particular
legal outcome [hukm mu'ayyan] but rather that the jurist, in engaging in a thorough investigative process, coupled with his belief in the rightness of his determination, arrives at God's law.1 7
In both cases, the schools were making a claim about the objectivity of the law. Both claimed that God's law was potentially attainable. But the Mukhatti'a school argued for a conception of
17. Besides Abou El Fadl's Article and his Speaking in God's Name, which oudine
these arguments carefully, see also 2 ABU AL-HUsAYN MUHAMMAD B. 'ALl B. AL-TAIB ALBASRI, AL-MU'TAMAD FI USUL AL-FIQH 372-96 (1983).
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legal objectivity that held that God has a specific intent as to particular rules of law. Whether one was capable of actually knowing that specific intent, however, was a different matter. The
Musawwiba school, on the other hand, argued for a different
conception of legal objectivity that made the law's objectivity dependent not on a notion of divine specific intent, but rather on
epistemology. The jurist, according to the Musawwiba school,
was deemed to have engaged in the best epistemological inquiry
possible, and hence through that epistemology, he arrives at
God's law. Objectivity is therefore a function of epistemological
exertion, and therefore interpretation.1 8
But what is crucial is that in both cases what is arrived at is
very much a human determination. Both schools of jurists may
aspire to reach God's law, but whether it is in fact God's law is
beyond human comprehension. What is left, therefore, is simply
human understanding, or fiqh. The Shari'ah, as the ideal of
God's law, is therefore a metaphysical entity distinct from
human attempts to comprehend it. It is a goal to aspire towards,
but not a goal to be actualized.
The necessity of the human agent in the interpretive process, however, extends beyond the determination of law. As
noted above, Shari'ah is not simply about substantive law, but
rather is a way of thinking about the relationship between the
Divine will, human interpretation, and human reality. As Abou
El Fadl suggests, one can apply this Shari'ah discourse to determine the nature of an Islamic political system. The creation of
Islamic institutions of power is very much a negotiated product.
God's will as to a governmental structure, just as His law ruling
human behavior, lies beyond the certainty of human comprehension. It is at most an aspirational ideal that motivates human
negotiation and interpretation. But what is important to Abou
El Fadl's argument is that the type of political system Muslims
create and justify, whether monarchical, dictatorial, or democratic, depends on their premoral philosophical presuppositions. These presumptions exist prior to their interpretation of
the Islamic tradition, and their negotiative efforts to construct a
political order through practical reasoning.
18. SeeJules Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 549, 549-650 (1993) (discussing the idea of legal objectivity as a function of
epistemology).
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Central to Abou El Fadl's argument is the need for Muslims
to make a premoral commitment to democracy. Such a
premoral commitment is not simply a function of political expediency or opportunism. Rather, as the Islamic tradition suggests,
the human agent plays a significant role in the determination of
that premoral commitment on the basis of a rational investigation into the various signs of God's creation. Whether one inquires into law or political science, Shari'ah's discourses empower the human agent to come to terms with the Divine Will in
light of the totality of existence and creation. The resulting governmental structure may not necessarily be what God wills, but
that is not what humanity is obligated to determine. We are
charged with the search. And as Abou El Fadl rightly points out,
the search for the harmony between Islam and democracy begins with a premoral commitment to democracy.

